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Productivity and Economic Growth
THERE are a number of measures of economic growth, each with its own
meaning and uses. In this chapter, the relationship of productivity change
to three aggregate growth measures is quantified. So also are certain
characteristic trends in the composition of both output and input which
seem to be related to the dynamics of economic growth in general and
productivity advance in particular.
The most direct measure of economic growth is the real net national
product. Increments to real product can be directly partitioned between
increases in inputs and in productivity. The productivity increment is,
of course, the gain in real income accruing to the factors of production,
and the distribution of that gain will be analyzed in the next chapter.
From a broader viewpoint, only if real net product grows proportion-
ately more than the population does is there economic progress. As a
second measure, therefore, real net product per capita is used. We
also look at changes in the ratio of consumption to total net product
to see to what extent output growth has been used to raise potential
economic welfare directly as compared with its use for investment goods
or national security. Since the rise in real net product per capita results, in
part, from an increase in input per capita, changes in the structure of'
factor input, and changes in certain types of nonfactor input as well,
will be examined from the view-point of their relation to productivity
advance.
The third type of measure is one that breaks down the real gross national
product of each period between that part required to support the popula-
tion and capital of the prior year, and a "margin over maintenance."
Some of the margin must go for national security, but the rest may be
used to support population increases, or to increase consumption and
investment per capita as compared with the previous period.This
approach reveals the anatomy of progress better than the conventional
classification of the net national product and permits an appraisal of the
relative importance of productivity gains in economic progress as defined.
Certain significant types of investment are not included or identified as
such in the national product measures, however, and this omission is
repaired in a final section of the chapter.
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Xational Output, Input, and Productivity
In this chapter, the national security version of the Kuznets estimates of
real net national product is employed.It will be remembered that his
measure comprises private and public consumer outlays and net invest-
rnent, to which we have added national security expenditures. Although
the statistical basis of Kuznets' segregation of government output between
final and intermediate products (and thus the implied productivity of
factors commanded by governments) is tenuous, use of his estimates makes
possible a comprehensive analysis of national economic growth in terms of
major social purposes. His estimates include real net income from abroad
that contributes to American planes of living, even though the associated
net capital stock is located abroad.
PARTITIONING OF CHANGES IN TOTAL REAL PRODUCT
Between 1889 and 1953, the real net national product grew from less than
$20 billion to $187 billion (in 1929 prices). This nearly tenfold increase
over the sixty-four years represents an average annual compound ratt of
growth of better than 3.5 per cent. As indicated in Table 6, the rate of
growth was highest in the early part of the period and was subject to
TABLE 6
National Economy: Growth Rates in Real Product, Factor Input,
and Productivity, Subperiods, 1889—1957










1889—1953 3.6 2.0 1.6
(1889—1957) 3.5 1.9 1.6
1889—1919 4.2 2.8 1.4
1919—53 3.1 1.3 1.7
1889—99 4.5 2.9 1.5
1899—1909 4.3 3.1 1.1
1909—19 3.8 2.3 1.5
1919—29 3.1 1.6 1.4
1929—37 0.2 —0.9 1.1
1937—48 4.4 2.2 2.2
1948—53 4.7 2.2 2.4
(1953—57) 2.2 0.7 1.5
SoimeE: Table A-XIX.
aKuznets'concept, national security version.
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progressive retardation right up through the prosperous 1920's. Following
the stagnation of the 1930's, which saw little net gain in real output, the
rate of growth picked up markedly and through 1953 was comparable
with that of the pre-Worid War I decades (see Chart 6).
The rate of growth is slightly less when the long period is extended to
1957, as is shown in Table 6, for purposes of comparison with the data
given in Chapter 3. This is due to the indicated retardation in the rate of
growth between 1953 and 1957. At the time of writing, Kuznets' estimates
were available only through 1953, and this terminal date is generally used
in the rest of the chapter. For trend analysis, a few years more or less make
little or no difference in the conclusions.
Over the period 1889—1953, national productivity increased at an
average annual rate of 1.6 per cent a year, accounting for somewhat under
half of the total growth of output. The rest of the expansion is attributable
to the growth of input, which averaged 2.0 per cent a year. Up until 1919,
however, productivity accounted for only one-third of the output increase,
whereas since 1919 productivity has become, on balance, as important an
element as input. This is partly the result of retardation in the rate of
output growth and partly the result of an acceleration in the rate of
increase in productivity. Based on the Kuznets estimates underlying this
analysis, the productivity acceleration shows up after 1937; the growth
rate averaged 1.3 per cent prior to 1937 and around 2.3 per cent thereafter.
Judging from the real private domestic product estimates, however, the
higher rate of growth began at about the end of the World War I.
Table 7 gives the results of a more elaborate attempt to partition the
increments in real product between the factor input and productivity
components. Since we are dealing with increments, averages were taken
of annual changes over the several periods and subperiods.As first
approximations to the input and productivity increments, the percentage
changes in these variables were applied to the real net product of the
previous year; the difference between the sum of these two increments
and the total annual change in real net product (the "joint product" of
the two components) was split equally between the variables in accordance
with the procedure developed by Frederick C. Mills.' The general picture
is similar to that obtained by comparing the relative rates of change in
Table 6. Over the period as a whole, productivity is computed to have
accounted for 48.5 per cent, as compared with 44.4 per cent, of the
real-product increments.In a couple of the subperiods, however, the
relative importance of the productivity increase is quite different when
based on results obtained from the more painstaking method underlying
Table 7.
1ProYuctivity and Economic Progress, Occasional Paper 38, New York (NBER), 1952, p.3 I,
n. 3. The equal division of the joint product hasbeencriticized as being arbitrary.
80PRODUC TI AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
CHART 6
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TABLE 7
Partitioning of Increments in Real Net National Product between
Factor Input and Productivity, Subperiods, 1889—1953
PERIOD OP REAL INCREMENTS ALLOCATION OP PRODUCT INCR.EMENTSb










1889—195375,141 2,579 1,329 51.5 1,250 48.5
1889—191837,783 1,546 1,133 73.3 413 26.7
1919—53 107,163 3,464 1,497 43.2 1,967 56.8
1889—98 23,651 867 596 68.7 271 31,3
1899—190837,554 1,238 1,142 92.2 96 7.8
1909—18 52,142 2,534 1,661 65.5 873 34.5
1919—28 73,974 2,011 769 38.2 1,242 61.8
1929—36 74,390 150 —698 —465.3 848 565.3
1937—47 128,829 5,390 2,454 45.5 2,936 54.5
1948—53 166,454 6,774 3,874 57.2 2,900 42.8
NNP =netnational product. From Table A-XIX (Kuznets' concept, national
security version); absolute figures estimated from 1929 value and weighted index of
output.
Estimatedby procedure of F. C. Mills, Productivity andEconomicProgress, Occasional
Paper 38, New York (NBER), 1952, p. 31, n. 3.
PRODUCTIVITY AND CHANGES IN REAL PRODUCT
Between 1889 and 1953, while output was increasing between nine- and
tenfold, the population of the nation grew from 62.5 million persons to over
160 million—roughly two and one-half times. Thus, output per capita
grew by somewhat less than 300 per cent, which averages out at 2.1 per
cent a year. On this basis, the gain of 1.6 per cent in the average annual
rate of productivity accounts for about three-fourths of the increase in
output per capita. The growth of input per capita accounts for the other
fourth (see Chart 7,PanelA) •2
Over the seven subperiods shown in Table 8, the rates of growth of real
product per capita varied considerably; the weighted average deviation
of the subperiod rates from the long-period rate of 2.1 per cent was 0.8 per
cent. The larger part of the variation is traceable to variations in factor
2 Solomon Fabricant has compared productivity changes in the private domestic
economy with changes in real private domestic product per capita in Basic Facts on
Productivity Change, Occasional Paper 63, New York (NBER), 1959, pp. 18—22. Since
froductivity rose more and real product less in the private domestic sector than in the
total economy, the relative importance of productivity is greater by Fabricant's measure
and differs somewhat over the subperiods in comparison with our measure.
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Productivity gains showed less variation;
subperiod deviation from the 1.6 per cent productivity growth rate over
the long period was0.3per cent. The several variables are plotted annually
in Chart 6.It will be noted from the chart and table that between 1919
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and 1953 (or 1957) there has been virtually no net change in input per
capita. Thus, productivity increase has accounted for the entire growth
of real product per capita since 1919, on net balance.
TABLE 8
Productivity in Relation to Levels of Living, Subperiods, 1889—1957
(average annual percentage rates of change)
Real Ratio of Real Total Factor Addendum:
NNP ConsumerConsumer Factor Input Population
per Capitaa Outlays Outlays Productivityper Capita
to NNPper Capitaa
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1889—1953 2.1 —0.1 1.9 1.6 0.5 1.5
(1889—1957) 2.0 —0.1 1.8 1.6 0.4 1.5
1889—1919 2.4 —0.4 2.0 1.4 1.0 1.8
1919—53 1.8 0.1 1.7 1.7 0.1 1.2
1889—99 2.6 —0.4 2.2 1.5 1.1 1.8
1899—1909 2.3 0.1 2.4 1.1 1.2 1.9
1909—19 2.3 —1.0 1.3 13 0.8 1.5
1919—29 1.6 1.3 2.9 1.4 0.1 1.5
1929—37 —0.5 0.5 —0.1 1.1 —1.6 0.7
1937—48 3.2 —0.5 2.7 2.2 1.0 1.2
1948—53 3.0 —1.4 1.6 2.4 0.6 1.6
(1953—57) 0.4 0.1 0.5 1.5 —1.1 1.8
NNP =netnational product.
SouRcE: Real net national product and real consumer outlays: Kuznets' concepts,
Table A-I, adjusted to conform with internal weighting method. Population: Current
Population Reports, Dept. of Commerce, Series P-25, No. 114; population prior to 1900
extrapolated by Kuznets' estimates.
GWhen100 is added to the average percentage rates, col. (1) =col.(4) x col. (5);
and col. (3) =col.(1) x col. (2).
Real consumption expenditures per capita increased by slightly less than
2 per cent, since the ratio of consumer outlays to net national product was
significantly lower in 1953 than in 1889 (see Table 8).This was a
concomitant of the much higher proportion of resources devoted to national
security purposes in the latter year. The somewhat erratic fluctuations in
the consumption ratio were chiefly the result of changing requirements for
national security.The main exception occurred during the 1929-37
period, when the proportion of resources devoted to investment declined
substantially. As a result, real consumer outlays showed a negligible drop
relative to population, although real net product per capita was 4.2 per
cent lower in 1937 than in 1929.
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The Changing Structure of Inputs
Although the increase in productivity has been much larger than the
growth of inputs relative to population, it is instructive to look at the
structure of inputs per capita. Total factor input is a composite measure,
and its growth relative to population is the net result of differential rates
of change in the components. Examination of the changing composition
of input not only fills in the arithmetic of economic growth, but also
furnishes some clues as to the sources of productivity advance.
GROWTH OF CAPITAL RELATIVE TO LABOR INPUT
The average annual rates of change in labor and capital inputs per capita
over the long period and the subperiods are shown in Table 9, together
with their relative percentage weights. Total factor input is equal to the
TABLE 9
Labor and Capital Components of Input per Capita,
with Measures of Factor Substitution, Subperiods, 1889—1957
(average annual percentage rates of change and percentage weights)
Total
Factor LaborInput Capital Input InputRatios











1889—1953 0.5 0.2 70 1.2 30 1.0 0.3
(1889—1957) 0.4 0.1 70 1.2 30 1.1 0.3
1889—1919 1.0 0.6 65 1.9 35 1.3 0.4
1919—53 0.1 —0.1 75 0.6 25 0.7 0.2
1889—99 1.1 0.6 64 2.4 36 1.7 0.5
1899—1909 1.2 0.9 64 1.7 36 0.8 0.3
1909—19 0.8 0.4 67 1.7 33 1.3 0.4
1919—29 0.1 —0.3 70 1.2 30 1.5 0.4
1929—37 —1.6 —1.7 75 —1.3 25 0.4 0.1
1937—48 1.0 1.2 77 0.5 23 —0.6 —0.1
1948—53 0.6 0.1 79 2.5 21 2.4 0.5
(1953—57) —1.1 —1.8 79 1.4 21 3.3 0.8
SOURCE: Table A-XIX and population series from Table 8.
aWhen100 is added to the average percentage rates col. (1) is approximately equal to
cols. (2) plus (4) times their respective weights shown in cols. (3) and (5). Col. (7) equals
Co1. (6) times col. (5), with allowance for the effects of rounding.
weighted sum of labor plus capital inputs. As between the two broad
factor classes, the growth of capital has been much greater than the
growth of labor input.Even after allowance for the smaller weight
85PRODUCTIvITr IX THE TOTAL ECOXOMT
accorded capital, it accounts for the larger part of the 0.54 per cent a year
average increase in total input per capita (0.36 compared with 0.18).
Changes in inputs on a per capita basis have a somewhat different
relative importance than straight changes. Thus, capital input increased
at an average rate of 2.7 per cent a year, about 60 per cent more than the
1.7 per cent rate of increase in labor input. However, the 1.2 per cent rise
in capital per head is four times the 0.3 per cent rise in labor input per head
(see Chart 6, Panel B).
The relative importance of the factors in total input growth varied
considerably over the subperiods. Whereas capital per unit of labor input
increased by 1.0 per cent a year on the average over the period, the
average deviation of subperiod rates was 0.7 per cent. The highest
average rates of increase in capital per unit of labor input were in the
first decade, 1889—99 (at 1.7 per cent a year), and the recent subperiod,
1948—57 (at 2.8 per cent). The postwar acceleration followed a low rate of
advance between 1929 and 1937 and an actual decline in the 1937—48
period as a result of wartime restrictions on private investment and of
early postwar capital shortages.
The last column of Table 9 shows the rates of substitution of capital
for labor; the substitution rates are equivalent to average annual percent-
age changes in the index of capital per unit of labor input weighted by the
relative shares of capital in the national income in the several subperiods.
On the average, the share of capital was about 30 per cent, but it declined
over the period, as indicated in column (5) (see Chapter 5 for a discussion
of the relative prices of the factors).
TRENDS IN THE COMPONENTS OF LABOR INPUT
Our estimates of labor input (L) in relation to population (P) can be
derived as the product of the ratio of the labor force (LF) to population,
the ratio of employment (E) to the labor force, average hours worked per




To derive labor input as such, it is merely necessary to multiply both sides
of the equation by population, which means substituting the labor force
itself for the ratio of labor force to population on the right-hand side.
The various elements into which the labor input estimates may be
divided are shown in Table 10 in terms of average annual percentage
rates of change. In general, it is evident that the average increase of 0.2
per cent a year in labor input per capita is fully accounted for by the
relative shift of workers and manhours into higher-paying industries
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(column5). Unweighted manhours showed a slight downward tendency
relative to population, as the increase in the ratios of labor force and
employment to population was somewhat more than offset by the- decline
in average hours worked per year (see Chart 6, Panel C).
TABLE 10
Components of Labor Input per Capita, Subperiods, 1889—1957
(average annual percentage rates of change)
Labor Ratio of Ratio of Average Labor
Input Labor Employment Hours Input
pcr Forcc to to Labor Worked per
Capitaa Population Forceb per Yearc Manhour4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1889—1953 0.2 0.1 0.2 —0.4 0.4
(1889—1957) 0.1 0.1 0.1 —0.4 0.4
1889—1919 0.6 0.2 0.3 —0.3 0.4
1919—53 —0.1 0.0 0.1 —0.6 0.4
1889—99 0.6 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.3
1899—1909 0.9 0.4 0.3 —0.3 0.5
1909—19 0.4 0.0 0.5 —0.6 0.5
1919—29 —0.3 0.1 —0.4 —0.1 0.1
1929—37 —1.7 0.2 —0.8 —1.1 —0.1
1937—48 1.2 —0.1 0.9 —0.5 0.9
1948—53 0.1 —0.3 0.5 —0.7 0.6
(1953—57) —1.8 —0.5 —0.8 —0.5 —0.1
a When100 is added to the average annual percentage rates throughout, col. (1)
cols. (2) x (3) x (4) x (5).
bThisratio is influenced by the fact that our employment estimates were derived
independently of the labor-force estimates. The rise in a ratio of consistent employment-
to-labor-force figures is less (see Appendix A).
CTheratio of total manhours to the average annual employment estimates.
The ratio of manhours weighted by average hourly earnings, by industry groups, to
unweighted manhours.
Labor force and employment ratios. The increase in the proportion of the
population participating in the labor force over the period was chiefly the
result of a relative increase in the population of labor-force age.But
even in relation to the population 14 years of age and over, there has been
a slight increase in the labor-force ratio, as the rising participation ratios
of women, especially in the 35—65 age bracket, have more than offset
declines in some of the other brackets. The increasing labor-force partici-
pation of women may be traced in part to increasing productivity in
household operation and to the shift of functions from the household to the
business sector.
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The ratio of employment to the labor force shows a small increase in our
table due to the presumedly lower percentage of employment in 1889 than
in 1953. It should not be inferred, however, that there has been an up-
ward secular trend in the employment ratio.There is considerable
variation from one key year to another. The most marked case is 1937
relative to 1929; the unemployment ratio was still relatively high in 1937,
a year which saw a cycle peak, but not full recovery.
Average hours worked. Manhours worked have increased less than aggre-
gate employment because of the secular trend toward a shorter workweek
and work-year. From close to 54 hours in 1889 (60 in the nonfarm sector),
the average annual workweek fell to 40 hours in 1 953—an average annual
decline of 0.4 per cent a year. The decline was by no means regular,
however. Especially rapid reductions in average hours took place in the
latter part of the 1909-19 decade, reflecting increased union strength in
World War I and the effects of the Adamson Act, which established the
eight-hour day for railroads; reductions took place again during the early
l930's, when shorter working hours were introduced over much of the
economy as a means of sharing the work.3
It can be argued that reduction in the workweek helps promote
productivity advance. There is some evidence to suggest that labor
efficiency per hour increases as average weekly hours drop, but this force
tends to wane with successive reductions in hours.4 Of possibly greater
importance is that insofar as shortening of standard hours comes at differ-
ent times in different industries and establishments without corresponding
reductions in the weekly wage, management is put under pressure to
increase the degree of mechanization and the efficiency of operations
generally.5 The same reasoning would apply to increases in wage rates,
hours remaining the same. The effect would vary depending upon such
forces as the degree of price elasticity of demand for the products of the
firms or industries affected.
The upgrading of labor.Since the effect of the declining length of the
workweek on manhours offsets the increasing ratio of employment to
population, the rise in labor input per capita may be ascribed to the
impact on labor input of the relative shift of workers and manhours from
lower- to higher-paying industries.It has been our contention that
industry differentials in wage rates reflect, primarily, persistent differences
Cf. Leo Wohnan, Hours of Work in American IndzLcfry, Bulletin 71, New York (NBER),
1938.
See Solomon Fabricant, Employment in Manufacturing, 1899—1939: An Analysis of Its
Relation to the Volume of Production, New York (NBER), 1942, p. 13.
This argument is developed by Edward F. Denison in "Measurement of Labor Input:
Some Questions of Definition and the Adequacy of Data," Output, Input, and Productiviçy
Measurement, Studies in Income and Wealth, Volume 25, Princeton University Press (for
NBER), 1961.
88PRODUCTIVITY AND ECONOMiC GROWTH
in occupational structures and that wage rates in different occupations
tend to reflect the differential contributions to product of different classes
of workers. Thus, relative shifts of workers to higher-paying occupations
and industries result in a greater "quantity" of labor input, reflecting the
use of more valuable talents of individuals or a greater investment in
training and development of innate skills.Interindustry shifts have gone
on rather persistently throughout the whole period. The view that these
movements have been associated with increased education per person is
borne out by figures presented in Table 22. Table 11 makes clear that the
TABLE 11
Social-Economic Distribution of the Civilian Labor Force, 1890—1950
(per cent)
Group 1890 1910 1930 1950
Nonfarm 57.4 69.0 79.0 88.1
Proprietors, managers, etc. 6.6 7.5 8.8
Professional persons 3.7 4.4 6.1 8.6
Clerks and kindred workers 6.0 10.2 16.3 19.3
Skilled workers and foremen 11.7 12.9 14.2
Semiskilled workers 14.7 16.4 20.3
Unskilled workers 21.4 19.8 16.9
Farm 42.6 31.0 21.0 11.9
Proprietors, managers 23.1 16.5 12.4 7.5
Laborers 19.5 14.5 8.6 4.4
SOURCE: Estimates for 1910 and 1930 as compiled by Alba M. Edwards, Census of
Population, 1940, Comparative Occupation Statistics for theUnited States, 1870 to1940,
Table XXVII, p. 187; estimates for 1890 based onoccupationaldetail from the same
source. Subgroups of nonfarm workers could not easily be identified except for profes-
sionals (ibid., p. 111) and clerks (Edwards, "The White-Collar Workers," Monthly Labor
Review, March 1934, p. 504). Estimates for 1950 from Cen.sus of Population, 1950, Vol. II,
Part I.
shift toward higher-paying industries was indeed associated with relative
shifts of the labor force towards more highly skilled or professional
occupations, and from farms to generally more highly remunerated non-
farm pursuits.6
Within the professional category of the labor force, there is one group
that is of particular importance in germinating new ideas and incorporating
them in improved technology—the scientists and engineers. Estimates are
6 Another investigator, weighting the numbers of persons in the various socio-economic
groupings by appropriate average earnings, found much the same difference between the
movement of weighted and unweigh ted gainful workers from 1870 to 1950 that we found
between manhours weighted and unweighted from 1889 to 1953 (see George Tolley,
North Carolina State University, unpublished worksheets; see also his discussion of
Denison's paper, op. cit.).
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presented in Table 12 of the numbers of engineers and chemists, 1890—1950,
and their ratio to the labor force. In 1950, chemists accounted for only
about one-eighth of the total but were still a slightly larger group than the
total of other natural scientists, such as physicists, mathematicians,
biologists, and geologists (but excluding the medical professions), for whom
data are not available prior to 1950. With around 90 per cent coverage,
the estimates give a good general picture of the growth of the technological
professions as a whole.7
TABLE 12
Distribution of Engineers and Chemistsa in the Labor Force,
Decennial, 1890—1950











David M. Blank and George J. Stigler, The Demand and Supply of
Personnel, New York (NBER), 1957, Tables B-i and B-2, pp. 144 47. The overlap in
1930 represents an adjustment of 1930 "gainful workers" to the labor force concept.
The overlap in 140 represents reconciliation of 1940 and 1950 Census counts of engineers.
For full description and derivation see ibid., notes to Table B-I and Appendix E.
aChemistsinclude metallurgists, and engineers include surveyors. Surveyors cannot be
segregated prior to 1930; they accounted for 0.024 per cent of the labor force in 1930,
0.031 per cent in 1940, and 0.044 per cent in 1950.
Over the sixty-year period, total numbers of engineers and chemists
increased eighteenfold, after adjustment for discontinuities in the estimates
for 1930 and 1940. As a percentage of the labor force, the increase was
about Sevenfold. This averages out as a 3.3 per cent a year relative
increase, about double the rate of productivity advance. There is no
retardation as yet apparent in the relative growth of the technological
professions. The marked slowdown in the 1930's as a result of depressed
economic conditions was virtually made good in the subsequent decade.
It is obvious, however, that this relative growth rate cannot continue
indefinitely.
7SeeDavid M. Blank and George J. Stigler, The Demand and Supply of ScientUic Personnel,
New York (NBER), 1957, p. 3.
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Median age of labor force. The median age of labor-force participants
increased by more than one-fifth between 1890 and 1955 (see Table 13).
Some observers think that aging of the labor force results in decreased
average personal efficiency, other things being equal, which would tend to
restrain productivity advance. Certainly, people pass the peak of their
physical strength and vigor at relatively early ages. This effect should
tend to be mitigated, if not offset, however, by the shift in skill and
occupational requirements that increases the average age at which mdi-
attain top proficiency. Peak earnings of professional people, for
example, are not reached until the middle years or beyond. It would be
TABLE 13













SOURCE: EconomicReport of thePresident,January 1957, Table C-4, p. 92.
hazardous to make any dogmatic statement about the relationship of
average age to efficiency arid to productivity advance in the face of
technological changes that gradually alter the occupational composition
of the labbr force. In any case, the marked increase in the birth rate since
1940 has caused the median age of the population as a whole to decline in
recent years, a development that will show up later as a drop in the
median age of the labor force.
TRENDS IN THE COMPOSITION OF CAPITAL
Real capital stocks were weighted by rates of return in a number of sectors
and industry groups to obtain an aggregate measure of real capital input.
As was true of labor, although to a lesser degree, there was a relative shift
of capital over the long period from industries with lower rates of return to
those with higher rates of return on invested capital (see Table A-9).
To the extent that higher rates of return are a result of greater intangible
investment by the firms in an industry (for example the cumulation of
technical knowledge from outlays on research and training),the
weighted series reflects more fully the qualitative aspect of capital services.
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S ome of the major changes in the sectoral composition of capital stocks
are shown in Table 14. The relative trends revealed clearly in this table
seem to be typical concomitants of the process of economic development.
Net investment abroad rose from negative figures prior to World War I to
positive amounts in recent decades. The relative importance of the "social
overhead" represented by publicly owned capital more than doubled
between 1889 and 1953. Within the private domestic sector, the per-
centage of farm to total capital declined by almost two-thirds. Residential
structures maintained a relatively constant ratio to total capital throughout,
but showed a mild tendency to decline. Nonfarm, nonresidential plant,
inventories, and equipment underwent a persistent and substantial
relative increase.
TABLE 14








1889 100.0 —4.1 5.5 98.6 38.9 27.6 32.1
1899 100.0 —3.0 5.4 97.6 30.6 30.1 36.9
1909 100.0 —1.6 6.7 94.9 25.3 28.7 40.9
1919 100.0 1.4 7.6 91.0 22.2 26.3 42.5
1929 100.0 3.2 9.0 87.8 16.3 28.5 43.0
1937 100.0 1.4 13.2 85.4 15.9 28.3 41.2
1948 100.0 1.9 13.7 84.4 15.6 25.9 42.9
1 953 100.0 1.8 13.1 85.1 14.4 25.5 45.2
SOURCE: Table A-XV.
aNetforeign assets.
An analysis (based on Table 15) of real capital stocks by major type is
possi ble for the domestic economy. Structures and equipment, the two
most important types of capital, each grew almost as much as real net
product until 1929. There were some subperiod variations between the
two output-capital ratios, but the trends were virtually parallel. The
1929-37 change was somewhat atypical, since real product and the stock
of structures showed little change, while the stock of equipment fell
relatively.
It is the trend since the late 1930's that diverges sharply from previous
experience. Between 1937 and 1953 the stock of equipment showed a
greater increase than real product. But the stock of structures showed
lit tie growth, and the output-structures ratio increased by almost 70 per
cent. Various reasons can be adduced to explain this discrepant behavior;
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for example, the greater relative increase in the cost of buildings than in
the price of machinery and equipment, the development of space-saving
innovations, and greater technological improvements in equipment than
in structures. In some important industries, such as the utilities, fixed
facilities are built up well ahead of demand, so beyond a point output
increases faster than plant as the latter is utilized with increasing intensity.
TABLE. 15
Domestic Economy: Major TypesofReal Capital Stocks and
Relation to Real Net Product, Key Years, 1889—1953
(1929 =100)
Land, Farm
and Forest StructuresEquipment Inventories
REAL CAPITAL STOCK DY MAJOR TYPE
1889 73 23 25 34
1899 86 40 33 42
1909 92 59 56 48
1919 98 72 80 73
1929 100 100 100 100
1937 101 101 89 101
1948 100 104 142 157
1953 104 120 203 188
RATIOS OP REAL NET DOMESTIC PRODUCT To REAL CAPITAL STOCK
1889 32 103 95 68
1899 41 89 107 86
1909 58 91 95 110
1919 75 101 91 100
1929 100 100 100 100
1937 102 102 116 103
1948 165 158 116 105
1953 197 170 101 109
SouIcE: Capital: Table A-XVI; real net domestic product (national security ver-
sion): Table A-I, col. (7) minus Table A-Ill, col. (4).
To the extent that construction-cost deflators do not fully allow for product-
ivity gains, the real-plant estimates obtained by deflation may have a
downward bias. But the possible bias is unlikely to be so large as to account
for a significant part of the divergent movement of the ratios of output to
fixed capital by type.
The ratio of output to inventories has tended upward through most of
the period. Between 1919 and 1953, the increase was about 10 per cent.
The increase between 1889 and 1919 shown by our estimates was con-
siderably greater—but it will be remembered that the private nonfarm
portion of inventories prior to 1919 was not estimated independently of
output. Yet it seems reasonable to suppose that there was a trend toward
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greater economy in the use of inventory stocks throughout the period as
a result of steadily improving transportation and communication facilities
and more efficient stock-control and merchandising methods generally.
The most striking increase was in the ratio of domestic output to land
(farm and forest), which went up more than sixfold over the sixty-four
years. Part of the rise is attributable to the less-than-proportionate increase
in the demand for agricultural products as total real product rose. But
gross farm output itself rose 30 per cent more than the acreage of farm
land employed as crop yields per acre and production per animal unit
were increased.
NONFACTOR INPUT TRENDS
Since the national product is measured net of intermediate products, a
reduction in materials consumed per unit of output is reflected in a higher
rate of increase in national product than would be shown if there were no
economies in materials use.Transactions in semiprocessed goods or
components are only of indirect significance in this connection, since
changes in such transactions relative to the volume of final products
reflect changes in raw materials use plus changes in the number of times
materials change hands prior to final processing. Since the latter factor
is largely a function of changes in the structure of business organization,
we can see the basic phenomena better by Jooking directly at the con-
sumption of raw materials relative to the national product rather than at
the ratio of total intermediate-product purchases to product.
Productivity and raw material economies.Economies in consumption of
materials per unit of output may result from fuller use of materials, a
higher degree of processing, or a decline in the ratio of commodities to the
national product.
Reliable estimates of domestic consumption of raw materials begin in
1900.8 Over the half century 1900—52, total apparent consumption almost
tripled, while real net national product increased close to sixfold. Thus,
the ratio of output to raw materials input has more than doubled
(Table 16), which means an average annual rate of increase of 1.4 per cent.
The foregoing comparison of real product with raw materials input,
however, considerably overstates the contribution of materials economies
to productivity gains since the value of raw materials obviously is much
less than the value of final products. Approximations to the percentage-
point increase in real national product and productivity attributable to
the decrease in raw materials consumption per unit can be calculated in
the following way: By adding the value of raw materials consumed to the
net national product, both in 1929 dollars, we obtain a measure duplicative
S See Raw Materials in the United StatesEconomy,1900—52, Bureau of the Census Working
Paper No. 1, 1954.
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of raw materials input; if we then estimate a hypothetical real net national
product by applying the 1929 ratio of the net measure to the measure
gross of materials, we obtain estimates of what the net national product
would have been had the requirements for raw materials remained constant
at the 1929 proportion. The ratio of the actual to the hypothetical measure
tells us by how much real product increased as a result of more economical
TABLE 16
Consumption of Raw Materials in Relation to Real Net
National Product, Key Years, 1900—52
(1929100)












1900 36.0 56.5 61.2 43.4 57.3 63.7
1909 52.8 72.2 76.5 56.6 75.9 73.1
1919 73.3 80.0 84.1 72.3 77.5 91.6
1929 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
1937 102.9 106.2 105.4 97.4 115.3 96.9
1948 163.7 140.3 131.0 141.7 159.4 116.7
1952 197.2 151.7 142.7 151.0 171.7 130.0
G NNP=netnational Kuznets'concept,nationalsecurityversion
(Table A-I).
Asestimated in Raw Materials in the United States Economy, 1900—52, Bureau of the
CensusWorking Paper No. 1, 1954.
use of materials—assuming that resources are interchangeable between
raw materials production and other uses without significant effect on
over-all productivity. This computation is carried out in Table 17.
Over the period 1900—1952 as a whole, materials saving and greater
processing accounted for a 0.25 per cent average annual increase in real
net national product—or about one-sixth of the average percentage rate
of increase in total factor productivity. The relative contribution from
this source was more important in the early part of the period—from 1900
to 1919, the relative importance of materials economy was about one-third.
Only in the period 1929—37 was there an increased use of materials per
unit of output and a small negative influence on net product and
productivity advance. Since 1948, the rate of saving in materials has been
somewhat greater than the average over the half century.
Reductions in raw materials consumption per unit of output have also
had an indirect influence on productivity change.If the hypothesis of a
tendency towards diminishing returns in extractive industries is correct,
then productivity advance in these industries and in the economy has been
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greater than would have been the case had raw materials production
risen more nearly in proportion to national output. That is, a sixfold
increase in raw materials production between 1900 and 1952, instead of
the less than threefold increase that actually occurred, would have placed
a greater strain on domestic natural resources and might possibly have
resulted in lower rates of productivity advance than were realized.
TABLE 17
Estimated Effect of Raw Materials Savings on Growth of Real Net
National Product, Key Years, 1900—52



























1900 32.8 10.3 43.1 35.9 91.3
1909 48.1 13.2 61.3 51.0 94.2 0.35
1919 66.7 14.6 81.3 67.7 98.5 0.45
1929 91.1 18.3 109.4 91.1 100.0 0.15
1937 93.7 19.4 113.1 94.2 99.5 —0.06
1948 149.2 25.6 174.8 145.6 102.4 0.26
1952 179.7 27.7 207.4 172.8 104.0 0.40
a NNP=netnationalproduct,Kuznets'concept,nationalsecurityversion
(Table A-I).
b Raw Materials in the United States Economy, 1900—52, Bureau of the Census Working
Paper No. 1,1954.
Col. (1) plus col. (2).
4 Product of col. (3) and 1929 of cot. (1) divided by 1929 of col. (3).
Col. (1) divided by col.(4).
I Ratesof change computed from col. (5) between terminal years of subperiods, ending
with year shown in stub. The average annual percentage rate of change between 1900
and 1952 is 0.25.
Unit consumption by type of materials. The consumption of raw materials
for food rose less in relation to real product than did the consumption of
raw materials for other uses. This is due in part to a smaller increase in
consumer outlays for food than in total real net product, especially prior
to 1929. But there is also evidence that the real value of food production
increased significantly in relation to raw materials input due primarily to
greater processing but also to more complete use of the raw materials.
Economies in the use of physical-structure materials are partly a function
of the increasing proportion of national product going into services rather
than goods. Based on Kuznets' estimates, consumer services rose from
28 per cent of real net national product (national security variant) in
1900 to 37 per cent in 1929. The trend does not appear to have continued
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since 1929. Based on a careful study by the Commerce Department, the
proportion of real gross national product accounted for by services, as
distinguished from commodities and construction, increased only from 30
per cent in 1929 to 31 per cent in
A more important factor in the declining raw materials proportion of
the national product is the increase in the durable goods proportion—for
the ratio of raw materials purchases to total value added is smaller in
durable goods manufacture than in nondurable goods. The Commerce
Department study indicates that durable goods increased from 18 per cent
of the real GNP in 1929 to 22 per cent in 1953.10 Based on the Kuznets
estimates, consumer durables plus producer durable equipment increased
from 13 per cent of real gross national product (national security version)
in 1900 to 16 per cent in 1929. But in addition to the greater processing of
goods resulting from technological advance and shifts in the composition
of demand, there was also undoubtedly some saving of materials in the
making of identical goods through reduction of waste, redesign, better
quality controls, and so on.
It is apparent from Table 16 that real product went up considerably
less in relation to energy materials than to physical-structure materials.
A more illuminating picture is obtained by relating the consumption of
energy materials to their direct output, and energy, in turn, to the factor
inputs and real product.
Energy consumption, inputs, and output.While real product went up by
less than two-thirds in relation to energy materiaJs consumed between
1900 and 1952, the efficiency of conversion of the energy potential of
inanimate energy resources into work output increased more than fourfold
between 1900 and 1950.11 In relating energy consumption to input and
product, we employ a measure of energy used for work output that includes
only operations which have been or could be performed by muscle power,
and excludes energy used for space heating, lighting, or refrigeration. One
such measure, in terms of horsepower-hours, is shown in Table 18.
In the 1870-80 decade, each manhour was provided with 0.55 horse-
power-hours of animal or inanimate energy; by 1950, over 5 horsepower-
hours were associated with each manhour—almost a tenfold increase over
the seventy-five-year period. The average annual rate of increase in the
ratio was 3.0 per cent, although after a period of accelerating advance
the increase in horsepower-hours per manhour slowed to an average annual
rate of 1.5 per cent in the 1930-50 period.
9"NewDistribution of National Output by Goods, Services, and Construction, 1929—
56," Survej of Current Business, June 1957, p. 9.
10Ibid.,p. 9.
"J. F. Dewhurst, America's Needs and Resources, A New Survey, New York, Twent&eth
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In relation to the real stock of capital, energy consumption more than
tripled over the seventy-five years. Between 1930 and 1950, however,
there was relatively little net increase.In relation to producer durable
equipment the increase was less marked, with a net decline occurring
between 1940 and 1950. Energy consumption per unit of real net product
more than doubled over the entire period, but since 1930 the deceleration
in its rate of increase relative to factor input was reflected in an actual
decline relative to output.
There can be little doubt that the substantial increases in output per
unit of input over the period were due in part to the striking increases
in nonhuman energy relative to input. This trend was promoted by a
decline in the relative price of energy as a result of marked increases in
productivity in the energy-producing industries (see Chapter 6). Certainly,
the increase in energy production was a necessary concomitant of the
increase in equipment per worker and of faster and more powerful
equipment. But the relation of energy to productivity is not a simple one,
as evidenced by the deceleration in recent decades in the rate of increase
in energy consumption per unit of input and a decline in relation to output
at the same time that productivity advanced at a faster rate than it did in
earlier decades.
The Changing Structure of Output
To complement the analysis of inputs as a means of gaining insight into
the dynamics of productivity advance, one can also analyze the composi-
tion of output. Parts of output are devoted to increasing the quantity and
quality of resources. Not all of these outlays are included or identified in
the national product estimates.
MARGINS OVER MAINTENANCE OF PRODUCT
One helpful way of analyzing the composition of national product is in
terms of the margin that remains after providing for the maintenance of
the population of each previous year at the previous year's level of con-
sumption and of net capital stock. This margin over maintenance, in turn,
may be broken down into the portions required for national security, for
growth of population, and a final "margin for economic progress" that
may be invested in increasing the tangible or intangible capital per person.
This margin gives us an alternative approach to the measurement of
economic growth or progress.It was suggested, in somewhat different
form, in an earlier National Bureau study by Mills.12
The real product necessary for maintenance of population is shown in
Table 19 (column 2). It is computed annually as the real consumption of










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0PRODUCTIVITT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
(averaged over the periods shown). The rest of the current-year real gross
national product (column 3) is a margin over and above the requirements
for maintenance of a given population with a constant level of capital and
consumption goods per capita. This margin may be theoretically disposed
of for purposes of growth—growth of population or of output per capita.
Some of the margin, however, is required for national security purposes
—the amount depending on the interaction of international conditions
and national foreign policy. Resources devoted to security purposes are
potentially available to support economic growth (and a small portion of
national security outlays does represent investment). But to calculate the
actual margin available for economic growth (column 5), national security
outlays must be deducted from the margin over maintenance of population.
The margin available for economic growth proper may be divided into
two components—that necessary to support the growth of population, and
that available for increased consumption or investment per capita. The
former (column 6) is obtained by multiplying the net population increment
of each year by the average per capita consumption and reproducible
capital stock of the previous year. By subtracting the real consumption
expenditures needed to support the population increment at the previous
year's level from the total increment to consumption, that part of con-
sumption outlay which serves to raise per capita consumption is obtained
(column 8); an analagous procedure yields that portion of real investment
which serves to increase capital stock per head (column 9). These last
two components constitute what may be called a margin for economic
progress, if the term is defined as the increase in real net economic output
(excluding munitions) per capita.
Quite consistently for most of the subperiods, approximately 84 per cent
of the real gross product has been required, on the average, to maintain
the real personal consumption level of the previous year and to offset
capital consumption. Of the remaining 16 per cent, national security
required about 2 per cent of GNP, on the average, through 1929, and
almost 14 per cent was available for population growth and economic
progress. A little less than half of this margin over maintenance of popu-
lation and security was needed to support the increase in population; the
rest was devoted to raising real consumption and capital stocks per capita.
The 1930's were atypical in that there was little margin over main-
tenance of population and capital. Even with very low national security
outlays, only 1.4 per cent of GNP was available for growth and progress
between 1929 and 1937. More than this was required for consumption
purposes by a growing population, and capital stocks per capita fell.
Since the 1930's, national security outlays have absorbed more than half
the margin over maintenance. If we skip over the war years, and consider
simply the period 1948—53, national security took 9 per cent of gross
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expenditures. Growth of population, while less than in the early decades,
was up from the 1930's and required 4.5 per cent of GNP. Only 3percent
of GNP has been available for economic progress—as compared with
almost 8 per cent before 1929. It is interesting that provision for increased
real consumption per capita has consistently absorbed between 1 and 2
per cent of GNP over the decades (except in the 1930's); therefore, the
large increase in national security outlays since World War II compared
with earlier periods has been mainly at the expense of the proportion of
product devoted to increasing the capital stock per capita. In fact, there
was no net increase in this component from 1929 until after World War II;
since 1948, about 2 per cent of GNP has augmented capital per head.
This bears out the implications of the total and partial productivity
ratios—rates of increase in capital per head or per manhour have little
relation to rates of increase in total productivity.Productivity growth
accelerated after World War I (after 1937, using the national measures)
whi]e capital per person showed smaller increases than before. A marked
increase in the efficiency of given quantities of capital has been associated
with the acceleration of productivity advance, and significant savings in
capital as well as in labor per unit of output have been realized.
PRODUCTIVITY AND THE MARGIN FOR ECONOMIC PROGRESS
Over the sixty-four-year period, the productivity increment has been just
slightly larger than necessary to provide for increases in real consumption
per capita. As Table 20 indicates, prior to 1919 the productivity increment
TABLE 20
Productivity Increment
















Per CentPer Cent of
of GNPConsumption
Margin















1948—53 187,230 1,706 0.9 2,900 1.5 170
SOURCE: Table 19.
was smaller, and after 1919 somewhat larger, than the margin for increased
per capita consumption. The more ample dimensions of the
productivity increment after 1919 are due to acceleration in its rate of
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growth, since the consumption margin averaged about 1.5 per cent of
GNP in both periods. The much larger relative size of the 1948—53
productivity increment was due both to a greater-than-average rate of
productivity growth and to a consumption margin that was squeezed to
smaller-than-average proportions by high national security outlays and
an expansion of net investment over that of the preceding two decades.
During this period the productivity increment provided almost one-third
of the capital margin in addition to the entire consumption margin.
On the surface, it might seem that there is some contradiction between
Tables 8 and 20. That is, the preceding section indicated that the rate
of productivity gain was less than the rate of increase in real consumption
expenditures per capita—i .6 versus 1.9 per cent a year, on the average.
But this is consistent with the analysis just presented, since the 1.6 per cent
is reckoned on the net national product (NNP) base, which is about one-
sixth higher than the consumption outlay base to which the 1.9 per cent
applies.
If the increase in planes of living largely absorbed most of the product-
ivity increment, the question may be asked as to the source of the rest of
the margin over maintenance of population. First, it should be clear that
the margin over maintenance, which averaged 16 per cent, is much larger
than the average increment to the real national product, which has aver-
aged 3.6 per cent. Productivity and input increments contribute less than
one-quarter to the total margin; the remainder results from the spending-
saving pattern of the community as influenced by the tax and expenditure
policy of governments.
The most striking tendency revealed in Table 19 is the relatively small
proportion of product since 1929 that has gone to increase the stock of
capital per head. Even the 2.0 per cent contribution in 1948—53 is only
one-third of the proportion in 1889—1919. The low ratio has been 'asso-
dated with a relatively high level of national security outlays (especially
since 1939), as is shown in Table 19 and in Chart 8. The method of financ-
ing those outlays has obviously tended to reduce investment relatively
more than consumption. During the war, capital goods were allocated
directly; but since the war, the upward trend of the interest rate has been
indicative of the tight, capital supply situation.
It is true that even with the small increases in capital per worker since
the 1920's, productivity gains have been greater than in the pre-1919
period, when the relative growth of capital was much greater. Widespread
introduction of capital-saving technology has made this possible, but it can-
not be said that productivity gains would not have been greater in recent
years had capital been more abundant. There is the additional circum-
stance that the national accounts as now constructed do not identify, nor
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capacity and of incentive. Also, some items charged to current expense in
business accounting, such as exploratory and research outlays, are not
included in national product, although they are really a form of invest-
ment. Government outlays for the same purpose are partially included in
national security outlays; by the Commerce Department concept, total
intangible and tangible public investment are included in government
purchases but are not separately identified.
Investment in persons.The two chief types of personal consumption
expenditures that fit the definition of investment are expenditures for
education and for health services. The Commerce Department estimates
of personal consumption expenditures plus public educational outlays can
be extended back to 1909 by major category to furnish a general picture
of total educational and private health expenditures (Table 21).
TABLE 21
Consumption Expenditures by Major Type, Key Years, 1909—53
TotalaFood, Clothing,Personal LeisureMedical
and Housingb Businesst)Pursuitsb Care
Education
CURRENT DOLLARS (BILLIoNs)
1909 27.3 21.9 1.9 2.2 0.8 0.5
1919 60.3 46.6 6.5 4.2 1.9 1.1
1929 80.5 54.6 13.3 7.4 2.9 2.3
1937 69.0 47.6 10.7 5.7 2.7 2.3
1948 181.4 128.5 25.0 15.1 7.4. 5.4
1953 236.6 159.6 38.8 19.6 10.1 8.5
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OP CURRENT-DOLLAR OUTLAYS
1909 100.0 80.4 7.0 8.0 2.8 1.8
1919 100.0 77.3 10.7 7.0 3.2 1.8
1929 100.0 67.8 16.5 9.2 3.7 2.8
1937 100.0 69.1 15.5 8.2 3.9 3.3
1948 100.0 70.8 13.8 8.3 4.1 3.0
1953 100.0 67.4 16.4 8.3 4.3 3.6
1909 446
REAL OUTLAYS PER CAPITA (1929 DOLLARS)
369 ii 40 13 13
1919 508 374 57 41 19 17
1929 670 454 111 62 24 19
1937 654 452 106 54 23 19
1948 880 608 136 78 36 22
1953 958 641 161 91 40 25
a Estimatesare those of the Department of Commerce for 1929 and later years, extra-
polated to 1909 by the estimates contained in William H. Shaw, Value of Commodity Output
since 1869, New York (NBER), 1947; and J. F. Dewhurst, America's andResources
New York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1947.Estimates of public educational outlay
(see Appendix K) were added to personal consumption expenditures.
bIlousingincludes household operations; personal business includes transportation;
leisure pursuits include recreation, personal care, religious and welfare expenditures, and
foreign travel.
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Expenditures for education increased from 1.8 per cent of total con-
sumption expenditures in 1909 to 3.6 per cent in 1953. Real educational
outlays per capita went up by 98 per cent over the forty-four-year period,
or at an average rate of 1.6 per cent a year. This probably represents an
understatement—since the price deflator is the average pay of teachers,
deflated expenditures are, in effect, labor input without allowance for
productivity change. Understatement is also suggested by the fact that
deflated educational outlays per capita went up less than total real
consumption expenditures per capita, although the opposite relative
movement is indicated by the current-dollar estimates.
The increasing personal and public investment in education is reflected
in the data relating to school enrollments and degrees earned (Table 22).
TABLE 22
Enrollments and Graduates in Secondary Schools and Institutions
of Higher Education," Decennial, 1890—1950
(per cent)
SecondarySchools Institutions of Higher Education
Enrollment Graduates Resident Earned Degrees
per 100 Persons per 100 Persons enrollment per 100 Persons
14— 17 Years Old 17 Years Old per 100 Persons
18—21 Years Old
21 Years Old
1890 6.7 33 3.0 1.2
1900 11.4 6.4 4.0 1.9
1910 15.4 8.8 4.8 2.1
1920 32.3 16.8 8.1 2.7
1930 51.4 29.0 12.2 5.5
1940 73.3 50.8 15.3 7.9
1950 763 59.0 19.3 18.8
HigherEducation forAmerican Deoi'nocracy, President's Commission on Higher
Education, 1947, Vol. VI; and the Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1956,Dept.
of Commerce.
aPublicand private.
Over the sixty-year period 1890—1950, enrollments in institutions of higher
education as a percentage of the relevant age class increased more than
sixfold, while secondary school enrollments per 100 in the 14—17 age class
increased more than tenfold. Numbers of graduates showed much greater
relative increases.
It seems inevitable that this striking advance in the educational attain-
ments of the American people should have increased the skills, efficiency,
and inventive potential of the labor force. It correlates with the picture,
shown earlier, of the relative increase in the skilled and professional groups
in the labor force, and with the relative shift of workers to higher-paying
occupations and industries. To this extent, investment in self is reflected
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in our labor input measure. Within the same occupational groupings
there must have been a trend towards higher educational attainment that
should have increased the efficiency of labor within the various industries,
but this part of the investment in persons does not affect labor input as
measured.
Relative increases in private health outlays have also been striking
(see Table 21). If public health expenditures were included, total levels,
and possibly the increases as well, would be greater. The increasing outlays
for health and related items were not without effect, if life expectancy may
be taken as a criterion. As indicated in Table 23, the average life expect-
ancy at birth in the United States increased from 47.3 years in 19OtY to
TABLE 23
Average Length of Life and Survival Rates, by Sex and Color,





ESTIMAThD AVERAGE LENGTH OF LIFE (YEARS)
1900 47.3 46.6 48.7 32.5 33.5
1909 52.1 50.9 54.2 34.2 37.3
1919 54.7 54.5 57.4 44.5 44.4
1929 57.1 57.2 60.3 45.7 47.8
1937 60.0 59.3 63.8 48.3 52.5
1948 67.2 65.5 71.0 58.1 62.5
1953 68.8 66.8 72.9 59.7 64.4
1955 69.5 67.3 73.6 61.2 65.9
PROBABILITY OP SURVIVAL To AGE 65
PER 100 PERSONS ATFAINING AGE 15
1900—02 50.3 54.3 31.9 35.3
1919—21 58.5 61.2 41.3 37.0
1939—41 62.6 72.7 40.6 45.1
1953 66.9 80.9 50.0 59.6
SOURCE: Abridged Life Table.c: United States, 1954, Vital Statistics—Special Reports:
National Summaries, Vol. 44, No. 2, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
May 15, 1956, Table 5 and derivation from Table 3.
69.5 years in 1955. The health and efficiency of labor-force members also
probably improved over the period. More important, increasing survival
rates mean that the investment in the birth, upbringing, and education of
individuals yielded higher total returns.
There is a problem of distinguishing between gross and net investment
in personal productive capacity. That part of investment-type outlays
required to maintain the productivity of a given population at its previous
level is akin to tangible investment designed to offset capital consumption.
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The part of real outlays associated with increased population and increased
outlays per person is a rough approximation of the net investment
involved.
Although we have singled out two types of consumption expenditures
for special comment, the rise in per capita consumption expenditures
generally must have had a stimulating effect on personal efficiency and on
productivity. Certainly, increasing per capita outlays for food, clothing,
and shelter, for example, must have had some effect on health in addition
to the effect of higher direct health outlays. More generally, the experience
of rising planes of living, both for oneself and for those around one, must
have raised standards and aspirations and so exerted a strong incentive
effect on individuals to strive for further material progress.'4
Intangible investment bj business and government. There are several types of
tangible and intangible investment that are charged by business firms to
current expense. The Commerce Department attempts to estimate the
volume of producers' durable equipment so charged and includes it in
gross private domestic investment. Expenses of oil companies in drilling
oil and gas wells are treated likewise. But several types of intangible
investment, and certain mineral exploratory expenses, are not included in
the national product or, in the case of public investment, are not segre-
gated from other outlays.
Of the intangible investments, probably the most important types are
expenditures for training and other ways of improving the efficiency of
employees, and research and development outlays for the purpose of
devising new equipment, processes, and procedures for increasing efficiency
generally.
Unfortunately, data are not available to show the trend of training and
educational costs incurred by industry. The total is undoubtedly large.
In-plant training and various forms of apprenticeship have been practiced
since time immemorial.If estimates were available for recent times,
however, the general trend shown above by the estimates of public and
private personal educational outlays would probably not be greatly
modified by inclusion of business outlays for the same purpose.
Estimates are available for research and development outlays since 1920.
The figures shown in Table 24 include publicly financed as well as business
outlays. The estimates since 1941 are more reliable and more compre-
hensive than the earlier estimates. Although the two sets of estimates are
not continuous, it is apparent that research and development expenditures
14Thistheme has been elaborated by Ruth Mack, "Trends in American Consumption
and the Aspiration to Consume," American Eco,zomic Review, Papers and Proceedings, May 1956,
pp. 55—68. She writes: "I hold that one cannot adequately explain. .. thegrowth in
real consumption. .. withoutrecognizing the unusual force of the drive to consume and
its effect in activating productive effort" (p. 58).
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have increased at a significantly higher rate than the net national product.
The ratio of research and development outlays to national product has,
however, not increased at an accelerating rate.The ratio more than
doubled during the 1920's, doubled in the 1930's, and increased by one-
half in the 1940's. On the basis of a McGraw-Hill survey of business
TABLE 24
Research and Development Expenditures in Relation to
Net National Product, Selected Years, 1920—55
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OUTLAYS
OldSeriesb New Series"
NNPG Millions Per cent Millions Per cent
Miflions of NNP of NNP
1920 $78,100 $59 0.08
1930 77,660 166 0.21
1940 83,915 345 0.41
1941 109,911 $900 0.82
1950 239,408 2,870 1.20
326,023 5,400 1.66
P =preliminary.
aNNP=netnational product, Kuznets' concept, national security version, in current
dollars.
b Estimated from figures shown in Vannevar Bush, Science, the Endless Frontier, A Report
to the President, July 1945, p. 80.
The Growth of Scientjfic Research and Development, Dept. of Defense, 1953, p. 10, and
preliminary reports of United States National Science Foundation. The estimates com-
prise expenditures by government, industry, and nonprofit institutions for basic and applied
research in the sciences (including medicine) and engineering and for the design and
development of prototypes and processes. Excluded are quality control, routine product
testing, sales promotion or services, and research in the social sciences and psychology.
intentions to spend for research and development,'5 it appears that
the ratio will again increase by more than one-half in the 1950's.
Before World. War I, organized industrial research laboratories were
much more the exception than the rule.16 Invention and development
had, of course, been going on in a more or less informal manner for a very
long time. But it was the work of technically minded, and sometimes
trained, individuals working chiefly as individuals—as proprietors or works
managers in larger firms, as professional scientists, inventors, or both,
15 McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., Dept. of Economics, Business' Plans for New Plants and
Equipment, 1958—1961, 11th Annual Survey, New York, undated.
16 The first directory of industrial laboratories appeared in 1920 (Research Laboratories
in Industrial Establishments of the United States, National Academy of Sciences).
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or as production workers. In recent decades, invention and the develop-
ment of innovations have become systematized and routinized, involving
teams of scientists and engineers working in complex laboratories. The
more informal type of innovation continues to be significant, but it is
certainly of declining relative importance. Taking both informal and
organized research and development together, its growth has extended
over a much longer period of time and been more gradual than the growth
of organized research and development alone—as witness the figures
presented earlier on scientists and engineers in relation to the labor
force. Even the latter comparisons probably overstate the growth of innova-
tional activity, since untrained persons were relatively more important in
earlier days.
Although we cannot measure it precisely, research and development
activity is our best indication of the investment in scientific and techno-
logical advance that sooner or later results in productivity growth. We
should not forget, however, that the volume and relative trend of this type
of intangible investment depends on fundamental social values and
institutions. The effect on productivity also depends partly on the rate at
which cost-reducing innovations spread. This again is a function of social
and institutional factors, such as the degree of competition, the availability
and cost of financing, the availability of properly trained workers, and the
state of long-run expectations.
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